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DECEPTIVE RESULTS: WHY MEDIATION 
APPEARS TO FAIL BUT ACTUALLY 
SUCCEEDS 
Scott Sigmund Gartner* 
INTRODUCTION 
Mediation is one of the most prevalent and commonly touted 
forms of international conflict management.1 Yet, compared to other 
forms of peacemaking such as bilateral negotiation, international 
disputes that receive mediation are less likely to result in peace 
agreements, and mediated agreements are more likely to fail.2 
Furthermore, data seem to suggest the opposite of what is commonly 
believed about specific types of mediation.3 For example, scholars 
and policymakers frequently champion civil war mediation by 
regional governmental organizations.4 Yet, more than half of all civil 
war peace agreements reached through regional governmental 
organization mediation fail in less than a week.5 Assessing a wide array 
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of factors affecting civil war peacemaking, regional organization 
mediation is the best predictor of agreement failure.6 
Why does mediation seem to have such poor results? It is a 
problem of deceptive appearances. A concept called “selection 
effects” exerts powerful negative influences on what we observe; 
ostensibly suggesting that mediation in general—and regional 
governmental organization mediation in particular—produce poor 
conflict management outcomes. In reality, appearances deceive; both 
mediation overall, and regional governmental organization mediation 
in particular, effectively lead to peace. 
MEDIATION 
Two aspects of international dispute mediation are critical for 
understanding these deceptive results: (1) participation in mediation 
and adherence to mediated outcomes is voluntary; and (2) mediation 
is costly. 
A.  Voluntary 
International dispute mediation is a completely voluntary 
process—no judge can order belligerents or a third-party mediator to 
participate. The third-party mediator must be willing to offer 
assistance, and the belligerents must be willing on their own accord 
to accept the third party’s offer to mediate.7 Unlike binding 
arbitration, mediation does not require a commitment in advance to 
accept an outcome. Adherence to a settlement reached through 
mediation requires the voluntary agreement of the disputants. 
B.  Costs 
Mediation costs are “considerable.”8 The costs of mediation 
vary with the type of actor. For example, in a civil war, governments 
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take a dim view of appearing to increase the stature of insurgents by 
sitting with them as apparent equals at the peacemaking table.9 
Insurgents might be concerned that they lack any control over 
mediation outcomes given their power asymmetry with a standing 
government.10 Mediators’ costs include: (1) forgoing other peace 
efforts; (2) damage to reputation from failure; (3) political costs; and, 
(4) operational expenses.11 Belligerents look at the human, economic, 
and diplomatic costs of additional violence, their likelihood of 
victory, and the various costs of mediation when considering conflict 
resolution.  
The voluntary and costly attributes of mediation combine to 
create powerful process and selection effects—dynamics essential for 
understanding mediation outcomes. 
PROCESS AND SELECTION EFFECTS 
The distinction between process and selection effects 
represents a critical innovation in studies of dispute resolution.12 
Mediators can choose among a wide variety of tools when working to 
resolve disputes.13  
Process Effects. Process effects reflect choices made during 
conflict management that directly influence outcomes, such as mediator 
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in International and Civil Wars, 35 INT’L INTERACTIONS 249, 254 (2009). 
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11 Leslie G. Terris & Zeev Maoz, Rational Mediation: A Theory and a Test, 
42 J. PEACE RES. 563, 563-83 (2005). See generally Jacob Bercovitch & Gerald 
Schneider, Who Mediates? The Political Economy of International Conflict Management, 37 J. 
PEACE RES. 145, 145-65 (2000). 
12 See Scott Sigmund Gartner & Jacob Bercovitch, Overcoming Obstacles to 
Peace: The Contribution of Mediation to Short-Lived Conflict Settlements, 50 INT’L STUD. Q. 
819, 820, 822, 835-36 (2006). 
13 See Kyle Beardsley, Using the Right Tool for the Job: Mediator Leverage and 
Conflict Resolution, 2 PENN ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 57 (2013); Molly M. Melin, When 
States Mediate, 2 PENN ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 78 (2013); Stephen E. Gent, The Politics 
of International Arbitration and Adjudication, 2 PENN ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 66 (2013) 
(explaining how similar types of choices also affect other dispute resolution 
methods, such as arbitration and adjudication). 
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strategy. For example, during the negotiations with Egyptian 
President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin, U.S. President 
Jimmy Carter guaranteed U.S. funding for military bases to both 
countries, a move that greatly contributed to the successful Camp 
David Peace Accords. Carter’s guaranty is an example of a process 
effect—an action that directly influences the mediation outcome. 
Process effects have a clear, causal effect on conflict management 
results—they shape dispute resolution success and failure. 
Selection Effects. Selection effects identify specific 
populations of cases that have particular conflict management traits. 
For example, imagine there are two types of disputes: hard (difficult 
to resolve) and easy (open to resolution). Difficult to resolve disputes 
typically involve higher levels of violence, greater stakes and more 
intransigent belligerents than easy to resolve disputes. While a great 
mediator might achieve success in a hard dispute and a poor mediator 
may fail to settle an easily resolvable dispute, on average, hard 
disputes are less likely to result in peacemaking success than easy 
ones. Thus, identifying the dispute’s type (hard or easy) helps to 
predict the likely outcome of any conflict resolution. Selection effects 
identify a dispute’s type. They distinguish the population to which 
disputes belong; but unlike process effects, they do not directly affect 
the conflict management process. Rather, selection effects signal the 
conflict’s likely type and thus its odds of a peaceful outcome.14 
The difference between selection and process effects can be 
illustrated by comparing a student clinic and university hospital.15 The 
clinic refers serious cases to the hospital. The hospital treats the high 
risk cases—those with a greater chance of resulting in a fatality 
(selection effect). The hospital has superior medical resources and 
provides better treatment (process effect). Given a serious illnesses, 
students go to the hospital, even if its mortality rates are higher. 
Students thus take into account (likely without thinking about it) 
                                                 
14 Scott Sigmund Gartner & Molly M. Melin, Assessing Outcomes: Conflict 
Management and the Durability of Peace, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK ON CONFLICT 
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15 This example is drawn from Scott Sigmund Gartner & Aimee A. 
Tannehill, Negotiating with the Dragon: The People’s Republic of China and International 
Dispute Settlement Duration, 12 TAMKANG J. INT’L AFF. 69, 69-99 (2008) (Taiwan).  
 
2013 Gartner 2:1 
31 
selection effects; they recognize that the population of patients at the 
hospital is sicker and more likely to die than the population of 
patients at the clinic. Without consideration of the influence of 
selection, one would erroneously determine that the life-saving 
abilities of the clinic are superior to that of the hospital, when in fact 
the opposite is true.16 
SELECTION EFFECTS AND MEDIATION 
Because mediation is costly, belligerents try to avoid it. 
Disputants who talk between themselves and resolve their differences 
on their own do not have to bear the costs of mediation. Thus, 
bilateral negotiation between disputants represents the most efficient, 
low cost, conflict resolution mechanism. If bilateral negotiations fail 
or their differences make them unwilling to work together (for 
example, Sadat and Begin refused to be together in the same room 
after their first meeting at Camp David), then disputants who want a 
peaceful resolution process can turn to a third-party mediator. As a 
result, mediators work on tougher cases than those bilaterally 
negotiated; disputes that, as a result of the selection process, are less 
likely to result in peace. Mediation itself, however, has positive 
process effects. An identical dispute would be more likely to result in 
peace if it is mediated than if it is not. But in reality, disputes are not 
distributed randomly or evenly, among conflict resolution 
processes—mediators get the hardest cases, which are more likely to 
result in peacemaking failure. 
                                                 
16 Cf. Lori Guevara, Cassia Spohn & Denise Herz, Race, Legal 
Representation, and Juvenile Justice: Issues and Concerns, 50 CRIME & DELINQ. 344, 344-
45, 347-48, 366 (2004). Selection effects commonly manifest in legal contexts. For 
example, juvenile defendants who are not defended by a lawyer are more likely to 
have their charges dismissed and less likely to receive a secure confinement 
disposition than youth who retain lawyers. A defendant’s lawyer does not have a 
negative effect on the case’s outcome; rather, declining counsel signals a low 
likelihood of conviction and a low stakes case—selection effects. Id.; see also 
Michael Alexander Roach, Explaining the Outcome Gap between Different Types 
of Indigent Defense Counsel: Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard Effects Essays 
on Heterogeneous Treatments of Defendants within Legal Institutions (June 2011) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University). 
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When the nature of the dispute is taken into account, analyses 
show that international dispute mediation has a positive process 
effect on reaching durable agreements.17 
SELECTION EFFECTS AND REGIONAL GOVERNMENTAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 
One way to develop a better understanding of how mediation 
exerts deceptive selection effects is to look at a specific type of 
mediation. For example, consider civil war mediation by regional 
governmental organizations. The Organization of American States, 
The African Union, and The Arab League represent examples of 
regional governmental organizations. Today, “regional organizations 
are the most common type of IOs [International Organizations] in 
the world system.”18 As the number of regional organizations has 
increased, so has their role in conflict management, and specifically as 
mediators. Comparing the periods shortly before and after 1980, the 
frequency of regional mediation almost doubled.19 
This increase is not surprising given widespread beliefs that 
regional organizations represent the ideal mediator type.20 These 
beliefs draw on four core arguments. First, regional organization 
member states frequently share political, economic, social, and 
cultural features with the disputants. Bercovitch and Houston argue 
that regional organizations are more likely to achieve conflict 
resolution outcomes than other types of mediators because they, 
“mediate within the same cultural and value system—and this, it 
seems, promotes agreement more than any other factor.”21 United 
                                                 
17 See Gartner & Bercovitch, supra note 12, at 822-23.  
18 Jon C. Pevehouse, With a Little Help from My Friends? Regional 
Organizations and the Consolidation of Democracy, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 611, 616 (2002). 
19 See Scott Sigmund Gartner, Civil War Peacemaking, in PEACE AND 
CONFLICT 2012 71-84 (J. Joseph Hewitt et al. eds., 2012). 
20 See T.H.Y. Nguyen, Beyond Good Offices? The Role of Regional Organizations 
in Conflict Resolution, 55 J. INT’L AFF. 463, 484 (2002).  
21 Jacob Bercovitch & Allison Houston, The Study of International Mediation: 
Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence, in RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS: 
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MEDIATION 11, 27 (Jacob Bercovitch ed., 1995) 
(stating a counter to this argument, however, is that regional organizations often 
contain their own super or regional powers with super or regional interests that can 
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Nations Security Council Resolution 1809 states, “regional 
organizations are well positioned to understand the root causes of 
armed conflicts owing to their knowledge of the region which can be 
a benefit for their efforts to influence the prevention or resolution of 
these conflicts”22 Second, neighboring states have a greater stake in 
peacemaking than outsider states or the U.N. and “must live with the 
consequences of their work,” which generates higher levels of 
commitment and trust.23 Third, disputants are less likely to view 
mediation offers from regional governmental organizations as stealth 
colonization efforts. Finally, regional governmental organization 
charters frequently encourage third-party peacemaking, making them 
willing mediators. For example, Article 84 of The Charter of the 
Organization of American States directs the Permanent Council to 
assist members in the “peaceful settlement of their disputes.”24 For 
example, the OAS successfully mediated the Belize-Guatemala 
conflict in 2000—a dispute originating from the independence of 
Spain in 1839 and which the U.N. failed to resolve.25 
There are also aspects of regional organization conflict 
mediation that are unattractive to belligerents. Given the inherent 
advantages of a sitting government, insurgent success in civil war 
requires support from neighboring states.26 The comparatively small 
                                                 
skew mediation. For example, consider the roles of: Nigeria in The African Union, 
Egypt in The Arab League, and the U.S. in The Organization of American States). 
22 S.C. Res. 1806, U.N. SCOR, 63rd Year, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1809, at 1 
(Apr. 16, 2008), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-
6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Coop%20w%20Reg%20Orgs%20SRES 
1809.pdf.   
23 John Paul Lederach & Paul Wehr, Mediating Conflict in Central America, 
28 J. PEACE RES. 85, 97 (1991). See also Marie Olson & Frederic S. Pearson, Civil 
War Characteristics, Mediators, and Resolution, 19 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 421 (2002). 
24 The Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of 
American States, “Protocol of Buenos Aires” art. 84, Feb. 27 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, 
721 U.N.T.S. 324, http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_A-41_Charter_of_the_ 
Organization_of_American_States.pdf. 
25 MONSTERRAT GORINA-YSERN, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW, OAS 
MEDIATES IN BELIZE-GUATEMALA BORDER DISPUTE (2000), 
http://www.asil.org/insigh59.cfm.  
26 Dylan Balch-Lindsey, Andrew J. Enterline & Kyle A. Joyce, Third-Party 
Intervention and the Civil War Process, 45 J. PEACE RES. 345, 345 (2008); Salehyan 
Idean, No Shelter Here: Rebel Sanctuaries and International Conflict, 70 J. POL. 54 (2008).  
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size of regional groups ensures all members have influence, 
accentuating concerns over bias.27 As a result, governments fighting 
civil wars abhor including regional organizations in dispute 
negotiations because it provides their insurgent’s benefactors 
influence in the conflict management process. Similarly, rebels 
recognize that the government they threaten likely plays a major role 
in the regional organization. Additionally, some states in the 
organization likely have their own insurgency problems and thus 
want to come down hard on rebel groups in order to deter challenges 
at home.28 
Given these disincentives, civil war belligerents prefer to 
avoid mediation by regional organizations and only select them in the 
most dire circumstances. As a result, regional organizations mediate 
particularly deadly and intractable civil wars—those less likely to 
result in durable peace agreements. When these selection effects are 
controlled for, however, and the intensity of civil wars are taken into 
account, mediation by regional organizations has a positive process 
effect on peacemaking.29 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Just like the best hospitals get the sickest patients and lose the 
most lives, the best peacemakers get the most violent and intractable 
disputes that produce the worst peace outcomes. However, when we 
take into account the deadly nature and known difficulty of resolving 
those international disputes selected for mediation, we see that 
mediation generally, and mediation by regional organizations 
specifically, facilitate the creation of robust peace agreements. 
                                                 
27 See Isak Svensson, Research on Bias in Mediation: Policy Implications, 2 
PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L. AFF. 17 (2013).  
28 See Navin A. Bapat, The Internationalization of Terrorist Campaigns, 24 
CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 265 (2007). This problem is complicated further 
by the frequent shifting preference for violence among ethnic groups. See, e.g., 
Victor Asal & Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Ethnic Conflict: An Organizational Perspective, 2 
PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 91 (2013). 
29 See Gartner, supra note 3.  
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Selection effects have two critical policy implications. First, 
selection influences how we should evaluate mediation failure. Some 
ineffective mediation is likely the result of poor mediators and weak 
peacemaking strategies. But other disappointing results, especially 
when generated by mediators and strategies thought to be highly 
effective, are likely misleading and result from selection effects. For 
example, the Camp David Accords mediated by President Carter in 
1978 have led to a peace between Egypt and Israel that has lasted for 
more than thirty years—in contrast to the five wars fought between 
the two countries in the thirty years prior to the Accords. But the 
Accords did not bring comprehensive peace to the region. After 
Camp David, mediators found it difficult to make further progress in 
this dispute. The Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinians 
have not operated as effectively as the Camp David Accords. Some 
might claim that these other mediators lacked Carter’s mediation 
skills. It is critical to remember, however, that the Arab-Israeli 
dispute remains extremely intractable. While the dispute’s violence 
and salience help it to attract the best global mediators they also form 
the conditions that make peace elusive. It would be wrong to equate 
failure to obtain peace in these disputes with the failure of mediation 
generally or the ineffectiveness of any specific mediators. Rather, we 
need to keep in mind that the intractable, violent, and globally 
important nature of the Arab-Israeli dispute both attracts mediation 
and makes it difficult to resolve—an apt illustration of selection 
effects. Given that the top mediators get the toughest cases, it is vital 
that we keep selection in mind when evaluating mediation efficacy. 
Second, potential mediators need to recognize that they face a 
trade-off. They can choose to mediate disputes that are likely to be 
resolved—but bilateral negotiations may work equally effectively in 
these disputes. Or, potential mediators can choose persistent disputes 
that are not likely to result in durable peace or civil wars that are 
especially challenging to resolve.30 These are the disputes that most 
require third-party assistance—they are both the most violent and the 
least likely to be resolved through the independent actions of the 
                                                 
30 See David E. Cunningham, Who Should Be At The Table? Veto Players and 
Peace Processes in the Civil War, 2 PENN ST. J.L. INT’L AFF. 38 (2013); J. Michael 
Greig, Intractable Syria? Insights from the Scholarly Literature on the Failure of Mediation, 2 
PENN ST. J.L. INT’L AFF. 48 (2013). 
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disputants—but are also the disputes that are most likely to result in 
failed mediation outcomes. Resolving these more intractable disputes 
requires a frustrating pattern of peacemaking efforts.31 Thus, 
mediators need to assess the value of mediation efforts based on the 
challenge of the task they face, not only on what they can achieve. 
These perspectives should not, however, suggest pessimism 
about mediation and peacemaking. Mediation of previously persistent 
disputes does not necessarily result in failed peacemaking. For 
example, the Colombian government has battled the insurgent group 
FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) since 1964. 
On March 1, 2008, Colombia attacked a FARC encampment in 
Ecuador, expanding the war and enflaming a long-simmering regional 
dispute. Viewing the attack as an illegal violation of its sovereignty, 
Ecuador cut diplomatic ties with Colombia. Colombia accused the 
Ecuadorian and Venezuelan governments of financially supporting 
FARC. Tensions intensified when Ecuador and Venezuela sent 
troops to the Colombian border.32 The OAS intervened rapidly to 
diffuse tensions by calling an emergency session and sending a 
commission to visit the countries and investigate the attack. The 
OAS determined that Colombia did in fact violate Ecuador’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. Columbia issued an apology and 
the countries resumed diplomatic relations. The OAS launched the 
Mission of Good Offices in Colombia and Ecuador which works to 
maintain peaceful relations between the two countries.33 Thus, 
                                                 
31 Birger Heldt, The Lack of Coordination in Diplomatic Peacemaking, 2 PENN 
ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 9 (2013).  
32 See Neighbors Cut Ties With Colombia, BBC NEWS, Mar. 4, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7276228.stm; Simon Romero, Columbia is 
Flashpoint in Chavez’s Feud with U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/05/world/americas/05venez.html?pagewante
d=all; LAURA CARLSEN, FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS, THE ANDEAN CRISIS (John 
Feffer ed., 2008), http://www.fpif.org/articles/the_andean_crisis.  
33 See Columbia and Ecuador, OAS PEACE FUND, http://www.oas.org/ 
sap/peacefund/ColombiaAndEcuador/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2013); Crisis Deepens as 
Venezuela Closes Columbia Border, AFP, Mar. 4, 2008, http://afp.google.com/ 
article/ALeqM5iWzlEd06o1UoIdZxv17wkp18uz4g; TATIANA WAISBERG, AM. 
SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW, COLUMBIA’S USE OF FORCE IN ECUADOR AGAINST A 
TERRORIST ORGANIZATION: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 
AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS (2008), http://www.asil.org/insights080822. 
cfm#_edn1.  
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despite an enduring dispute, a non-governmental actor and a 
violation of sovereignty—all factors known to make disputes more 
intractable—mediation worked. 
For those of us who participate in, study, or encourage 
peacemaking efforts, the results frequently seem grim. But we should 
not let mediation’s seemingly poor results dissuade us from 
promoting peacemaking. Rather, using selection effects we need to 
handicap the odds of mediation success and failure. Like many of the 
best hospitals, best conflict management practices may at first appear 
to be hazardous, but an understanding of the process and its 
challenges demonstrates their value and shows that appearances can 
indeed be deceptive. 
 
